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ABStRACt
Many overseas studies discussed the topic of corporate governance and performance in family companies, however, few 
studies have been conducted in Malaysia. The objective of this paper is to examine the board mechanisms and family 
companies’ performance using three performance indicators (Tobin’s Q, Earnings Per Share & Operating Cash Flow). 
The sample size is 189 family companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2003 to 2007. The findings from this study 
reveal that some of the board mechanisms influence family companies’ performance. This study evidenced that family 
companies with a large board size, low directors’ expertise and duality leadership contribute to higher family companies’ 
performance. However, this study found that the academic qualification of directors does not influence firm performance. 
Therefore, generally, regulators and investors need to be sensitive to the fact that family companies do have differences 
in corporate governance practices compared to non-family companies. 
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INtRODUCtION
Family businesses have been painstakingly nurtured by 
their founding fathers for decades, growing from small 
companies into multi-corporations. the uniqueness of 
family companies are that family firms have a great sense 
of family attachment and the majority of the ownership 
is in the hands of family members. In Malaysia, family 
companies are said to contribute more than half of 
Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (Ngui 2002). A study 
by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) found that about 
70% of Malaysian companies are family-owned. Some of 
the prominent Malaysian family companies include the 
Berjaya Group, Sapura Group, Melewar Group, Genting 
Group and YtL Group. 
 In terms of company performance there are many 
studies around the world comparing family and non-
family firms’ performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; 
Miller & Breton-Miller 2006; Villalonga & Amit 
2006; Ibrahim, Samad & Amir 2008; Amran & Che-
Ahmad 2009). However, research on Malaysian family 
companies looking at the board governance mechanisms 
and performance are lagging behind. to our knowledge, 
there are two studies that discuss family and non-family 
companies performance. The first, a study by Ibrahim et 
al. (2008), found that board size, independent directors 
and duality do show a strong relationship with firm 
performance. Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009) indicate that 
only board size and leadership show a strong relationship 
with tobin’s Q. the difference between this study with 
previous studies by Ibrahim et al. (2008) and Amran and 
Che-Ahmad (2009) are that this study focuses solely on 
Malaysian family companies, using data from 2003 to 
2007, and includes two new variables to be tested: 1) 
director’s qualification and 2) director’s expertise. In 
comparison, past studies compared between family and 
non-family companies, and the data used were until 2005 
only.
 In terms of financial performance indicators, this 
study used three performance indicators: tobin’s Q, 
EPS and OCF. Many studies have used tobin’s Q as the 
performance indicator (McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko 
2001; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; 
Martinez, Stohr & Quiroga 2007; Ibrahim et al. 2008; 
Amran & Che-Ahmad 2009), only some study tests used 
Earnings per Share (Mat Nor, Mohd Said & Redzuan 1999) 
and Operating Cash Flow as the corporate performance 
indicators in measuring the company share prices (Kaplan 
1989; Jain & Kini 1994; Kim, Kitsabunnarat & Nofsinger 
2002).therefore, this study considers both the market-
based and accounting based approach. the accounting 
performance measure is claimed to be a better performance 
measure than share market based measures. this is because 
the share prices are less likely to reflect all available 
information when the share market shows inefficiency. 
Nevertheless, the accounting performance measure is more 
directly related to its financial survivability than its share 
market value and allows the evaluation of performance of 
publicly traded companies (Sun & tong 2003).
 The objective of this paper is to examine the board 
mechanisms and family companies’ performance using 
three performance indicators (Q, EPS and OCF). this study 
aims to find the answers to whether there is any association 
between board mechanisms and family companies’ 
performance. This study is expected to enrich the literature 
in the area of corporate governance practice among family 
businesses in Malaysia. Particularly, this study uses a 
sample of Malaysian family companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. thus, the information revealed is reliable and 
useful to Malaysian family businesses and investors at 
large. 
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 the presentation format of this paper is as follows. 
First, the introduction section, objectives, motivation 
and contribution of the study will be highlighted. Next, 
discussion on stewardship theory, review of family 
businesses in Malaysia and board mechanisms will be 
deliberated upon in the literature review section. the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses development is then 
developed. The research methodology is explained. Then, 
the research findings and discussion are presented. Finally, 
research findings are summarised, followed by limitations 
and recommendations for future study.
LItERAtURE REVIEW
STEWARdShIp ThEoRy IN FAMIly CoMpANIES
Stewardship theory views that managers behave as 
stewards and gain higher utility from pro-organisational, 
collectivistic behaviour than from individualistic and 
self-serving behaviour, as presumed by agency theory 
(Jaskiewicz & Klein 2006). Managers who are usually 
the family members are not opportunistic and self-serving 
as suggested by agency theory, but are motivated to act 
in the interests of their organisations and to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth by improving organisational 
performance (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). In 
this theory, executive directors are seen as highly valuable 
to boards because they provide specialised knowledge 
and expertise about their organisations and are better 
at evaluating the CEO due to their familiarity with the 
quality of his/her decisions (Baysinger & hoskinson 1990; 
Wagner, Stimpert & Fubara 1998). 
 Research also claimed that when ownership is high 
and concentrated, the higher benefits and costs are borne 
by the same owner (Demsetz & Lehn 1985). Family 
companies usually invest most of their private wealth in 
the company. that is one of the reasons why families are 
more concerned with the firm’s survival because the risks 
are not fully diversified, and they have strong incentives 
to monitor management closely. the monitoring cost 
tends to be lower in companies controlled by family than 
by non-family (Fama & Jensen 1983; Fleming, heaney & 
McCosker 2005). the controlling shareholders will serve 
the interests of minority shareholders as well as their own 
interests (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz 2001). this 
will shun the exploitative behaviour of agents towards the 
principals (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In addition, it will 
reduce the agency costs and enhance firm performance. 
Furthermore, as a steward, family owner-managers will 
not be self-serving for their own economic gain, but for 
the organisation and stakeholders. thus, stewards will 
protect and maximise shareholders’ wealth through firm 
performance (donaldson & davis 1994).
 Ward (1987) argued that the behaviour of family 
firms differs from non-family firms because family 
firms incorporate family issues into their thinking. This 
is because the business and the family are seen to be 
absolutely independent (Ward 1987), with family and 
family dynamics likely affecting strategic choices and 
process in a way that is different compared to non-family 
firms (litz 1997; Chrisman, Chua & Steir 2005). The 
unique characteristics are derived from the patterns of 
ownership and corporate governance, such as family 
strategy, goals, spirits and family culture. thus, this study 
expects some differences in corporate governance in family 
companies. Since the family is likely to own sizable shares, 
the behaviour might not be exactly the same as that in non-
family businesses. the families who are directors of the 
company might work in the best interests of the company 
because of other reasons, such as altruism (Unselfish regard 
for or devotion to the welfare of others). In addition, most 
of the family companies in Malaysia tend to be ethnic 
Chinese. these Chinese businesses usually have close 
family ties within the family members, strong financial 
support internally and plan their businesses to be passed 
to the next generation (horii 1991; Sendut 1991).
 therefore, for studies relating to family companies, 
stewardship theory is more applicable in answering the 
research questions. It is expected that the independent 
variables (board size, independent non-executive director, 
director’s qualification, director’s expertise and leadership 
structure) could influence the company’s performance. 
FAMILY BUSINESSES IN MALAYSIA
Family businesses form an essential part of the Malaysian 
economy and it is estimated that family companies 
contribute more than half of Malaysia’s Gross Domestic 
Product (Ngui 2002). One study claims that the majority 
of family companies in Malaysia evolved from traditional 
family-owned companies. Family companies do not 
embrace openness in the firm’s practices and they still 
practice a similar business culture to the founders (Ow-
Yong & Cheah 2000). A survey conducted by Shamsir 
Jasani (2002) found that the majority of Malaysian family 
firms are small-scale; the founders manage the firm with 
help from their children and relatives; and the founders do 
not force the children to join the firms, unless the children 
themselves are willing to work with their families. 
 there are a number of prominent firms that are 
family-controlled, and the number of Malaysian firms is 
increasing yearly due to the positive economic growth 
(pricewaterhouse Coopers 1998; Claessens & Fan 2002; 
haniffa & Cooke 2002; Soederberg 2003). Although some 
of the prominent Malaysian family companies like Sapura, 
Melewar Group, Genting, YtL, tan Chong, Oriental and 
Berjaya Group have ventured into diverse economic 
sectors, there are also smaller companies like Habib and 
Kamdar that maintain their business within their respective 
sectors. For instance, the story of the Genting Group shows 
a well-planned succession in the family business. the late 
tan Sri Lim Goh tong appointed a successor to ensure his 
huge business empire will continue. Lim passed the baton 
to his second son, tan Sri Lim Kok thay, in December 
2003. the Genting Group is involved in gaming, power 
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generation, plantations, and oil and gas. tan Sri Lim Kok 
thay, a 55-year-old tycoon seems to have inherited his 
father’s ability to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities 
based on the group’s swift expansion abroad in recent years 
(2007, october 24). 
 For Bumiputera companies, some of the notable Malay 
families in today’s market are the Melewar Group founded 
by tunku Abdullah tuanku Abdul Rahman and Sapura 
Holdings Bhd started by tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir. 
Both families are now in their second-generation (Ngui 
2002). For a smaller business, Habib Jewel Bhd. is one 
of the relatively unknown success stories. this company 
was founded by Habib Mohammad in 1953 in Penang. In 
1988, the father (founder) passed the business to the son, 
Meer Sadik, who has been leading it ever since. there are 
also several successful northern Indian textile companies 
operating in Malaysia such as KAJ Chortimall, Globe Silk 
Store and P Lal Store. these companies are third-generation 
families. Unlike the Chinese and Bumiputera companies, 
the Indian companies have remained basically one-store 
operations, with little expansion or diversification. The 
Indian entrepreneurs remained conservative and largely 
cautious of firm expansion due to the highly competitive 
industry (Gomez 2001). 
 therefore, for family companies to remain competitive 
in the market, these companies need to ensure strong 
corporate governance practices. the board mechanisms 
such as board composition and size, composition of 
non-executive directors, director’s education, director’s 
expertise and leadership structure, as suggested by the 
Code on Corporate Governance (2001), help to enhance 
family businesses to achieve higher firm valuation and 
become more attractive to investors. 
 the following sections will discuss the hypotheses 
based on the theories and literature relating to corporate 
governance.
tHEOREtICAL FRAMEWoRK ANd HYPOtHESES 
DEVElopEMENT
the conceptual framework for this study is presented in 
Figure 1 to explain the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and family performance.
BOARD COMPOSItION AND SIZE
According to Jensen (1993), a board should have a 
minimum of seven or eight members to function effectively 
because boards with a small number of individuals are 
more likely to agree on a particular outcome. Local 
studies (Abdullah 2001; Zainal Abidin, Mustaffa Kamal 
& Jusoff 2009) suggest that the average board size is 
eight. A study conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
(1998) found that the average board size is eight, with two 
independent directors1, three non-executive directors and 
three executive directors 
 Studies claim that a large board is superior to a small 
one because big groups have more capabilities, resources 
and wider external contracting relationships (Zahra & 
Pearce 1989). Further, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) 
FIGURE 1. Conceptual framework for corporate governance mechanisms and family performance
1 Rule 9 of the KlSE listing Requirements define independent directors as directors who are not officers of the firm, who neither are related 
to its officers nor represent concentrated or family holdings of its shares; who in the view of the board of directors represent the interests of 
public shareholders, and free of any relationship that would interfere with independent judgment.
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explained that large groups can enhance problem solving 
capabilities and provide more solution strategies. Larger 
boards may be constructive for some companies as they 
provide diversity that can help companies secure critical 
resources and reduce environmental uncertainties. Zainal 
Abidin et al. (2009) also evidenced that larger board size 
contributes more towards firm performance as a whole. 
Larger boards mean that there are more ideas and skills 
that can be shared among board members. 
 However, studies have found that family companies 
have slightly smaller boards and lower board independence 
than non-family firms (Chen, Chen & Cheng 2008). The 
smaller board size may be due to a trade-off between 
growth and risk exposure faced by the firms. This is 
because of the high concentration of shares in the hands of 
a few shareholders (Gorriz & Fumas 1996). Expert studies 
do evidence a negative relationship between board size and 
firm performance. yermack (1996) conducted an empirical 
study on the performance effect of board size for a sample 
of 792 companies across eight years (1984-1991). The 
main finding shows a clear inverse relation between a firm’s 
market valuation and the size of the board of directors. 
 In another study by Mishra, Randoy & Jenssen (2001) 
on family founding companies in Norway, it was found that 
large boards are not as effective as small boards. Board size 
has a negative significant coefficient indicating that firms 
with a smaller board size achieve higher Q values. Research 
by Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) also claims that board 
size is inversely related to operating performance in UK 
firms. Mak and yuanto (2002) examined the relationship 
between size of the board and firm performance in 
Singapore and Malaysia. they evidenced that board size 
is negatively related to tobin’s Q. 
 However, Feris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) 
found a positive relation between small board size and the 
ratio of market assets to book assets for a large and diverse 
sample of firms. dalton, daily, Ellstrand and Johnson 
(1999) examined the relationship between board size and 
company performance using market and accounting-based 
performance indicators, and found that performance value 
is strong and positive in smaller firms. 
 A recent study in Asia (Hong Kong, taiwan, Singapore 
and Malaysia) evidenced that board size is significantly 
higher in family-owned companies in Asia (Chen & 
Nowland 2010). therefore, based on past literature, this 
study believes that family companies with a larger board 
size may enhance firm performance. This is because family 
companies may be enhanced by having people that possess 
skills, experience, qualifications and wider networking. 
Based on the arguments, we therefore hypothesize that:
H1: there is a positive relationship between board size 
and family companies’ performance. 
NoN-EXECUTIVE dIRECToR RolES
In family businesses, the representatives of non-family 
owners on the board could offer a functional counterpoint 
in decision-making. Ward and handy (1988) found that 
88% of firms using non-executive directors believe that 
their boards are more useful and valuable compared to 68% 
of those using executive boards expressing the same view. 
As argued by Gilson and Kraakman (1991), “corporate 
boards need directors who are not merely independent (of 
management), but who are accountable (to shareholders) 
as well”. Kosnik (1987) and Singh and Harianto (1989) 
argued that non-executive directors are more likely to 
be objective, independent and more capable of resisting 
self-interested efforts by executive directors to influence 
board decisions. 
 Besides the composition of non-executive directors, 
the proportion of family member representation might 
also influence firm performance. In countries where 
families have substantial equity holdings, there is 
generally little physical separation between those who 
own and those who manage the capital (Nicholls & 
Ahmed 1995). In Malaysia, there are a number of listed 
companies with substantial family shareholdings that 
elect family members to sit on the boards. the boards of 
family-controlled companies are dominated by family 
members or their close friends, and there are few truly 
independent directors (Meng 2009).
 despite the fact that non-executive directors can bring 
a new dimension of experience and objectivity that may 
not be found among family directors and managers, family 
firms do not generally employ non-executive directors. 
Generally, family firms have fewer shareholders and 
directors than non-family firms (Cromie, Stephenson & 
Montieth 1995). Ibrahim et al. (2008) claimed that family 
companies appoint fewer independent directors to be 
on the board compared to non-family companies. Ward 
(1991) argued that the owners of family firms are reluctant 
to appoint independent directors because they are afraid 
of losing control; disbelieve that non-executive directors 
understand the firm’s competitive situation; and are afraid 
of new, external ideas and viewpoints. Therefore, based on 
the discussed literature, this study posits that:
H2: there is a negative relationship between the percentage 
of independent non-executive directors and family 
companies’ performance.
DIRECtOR EDUCAtION BACKGROUND
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Revised 
2007) recommends that directors do have qualities (skills, 
knowledge and experience, professionalism and integrity) 
in carrying out their duties. Experts claim that individuals 
with higher qualifications are better at managing the 
firms. There is a positive relationship between individual 
education and conflict over money, management control 
and strategic vision.Educated individuals are found to 
understand financial matters more than their less educated 
counterparts. Directors that are educated are better at 
handling the problems and situations that may arise in the 
firms (Sebora & Wakefield 1998). 
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 Education is an investment in knowledge and, as a 
consequence, it increases productivity (Schultz 1971). 
Economies with well educated employees exhibit faster 
progress and more rapid increases in efficiency and 
productivity than those with a lower level of education 
(Becker 1962). A study by Romer (1994) claims that 
education and professional training endogenously 
strengthens the growth rate by increasing labour quality 
and productivity. Further, Schultz (1993) pointed out 
that the evolution of knowledge contributed decisively 
in the growth rates of organisations. Employees that 
possess particular capabilities, such as communication 
and decision skills, problem solving skills, team working 
skills, as well as adaptation in the continuous learning 
environment, tend to behave more professionally in their 
daily tasks (Agiomirgianakis, Asteriou & Monastiriotis 
2002; psacharopoulos & patrinos 2004).
 Educational background and skills may influence 
family firms’ performance. Additionally, a family’s special 
technical knowledge concerning a firm’s operations may put 
it in a better position to monitor the firm more effectively. 
Family members have an incentive to counteract the free 
rider problem that prevents atomised shareholders from 
bearing the cost of monitoring and ultimately reduces the 
agency costs (Castillo & Wakefield 2006). In addition, 
higher quality management passes on the true value of the 
firm to investors and reduces the information asymmetry 
(Chemmaur & Paeglis 2005). Directors’ educational 
backgrounds can supplement management in strategy 
evaluation (Ruigrok, Peck, tacheva, Greve & Hu 2006). 
therefore, based on the literature, this study hypothesizes 
that family companies also need to have qualified and 
educated directors to manage the family companies. these 
directors can help in advising the business operation and 
provide solutions for decision making. Family companies 
can also benefit from the directors’ qualification by 
gaining higher firm performance. Therefore, this study 
hypothesizes that:
H3: there is a positive relationship between directors’ 
academic qualification and family companies’ 
performance.
EXPERt QUALIFICAtION
the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(2007) stresses that nominating committees should 
consider recruiting directors that have skills, experience 
and qualifications. Research also notes that expertise may 
affect the firm’s performance. Companies should look for 
superior quality directors to monitor management (Fairchild 
& Li 2005). Directors’ background and competency are 
essential factors as they could contribute positively to the 
family firms (Johannisson & huse 2000). Consulting skill 
is a combination of diagnostic and behavioural skills that 
enable professionals to collaborate with line managers 
to develop solutions for business performance problems 
(Green 2008).
 As a professional, it is necessary to be competent and 
master the knowledge and apply it to specific business 
settings (Brockbank, Ulrich & Beatty 1999). Lawler and 
Mohrman (2003) argued that professionals need to become 
more effective strategic business partners. By having 
these characteristics, indirectly these professionals could 
positively influence the value of the company. 
 Kesner (1988) found that most directors’ occupations 
are business executives, followed by lawyers, consultants, 
and school professors. directors’ expertise, such as in 
accounting, financing, consulting and law, supports 
managers in making decisions. therefore, directors’ 
expertise can have a certain effect on firm value (hillman, 
Cannella & Paetzold 2000). 
 Dalton et al. (1999) contended that directors who 
have a professional or business relationship may be 
highly effective at resource dependence and counselling/
expertise board roles due to their industry contacts, 
business acumen, specialized knowledge and skills. they 
are appointed as board members so that the firm can tap 
into the resources that they bring. Similarly, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) posited that those directors who have skills in 
knowledge-based fields such as law, finance, accounting 
and consulting, are sought after because of their value-
adding advice and counsel.
 At the same time, firms are facing a challenge in 
searching for qualified and competent directors to sit on 
the boards (hendry 2002; hartvigsen 2007). A survey 
conducted in America by Ernst & Young found that many 
firms in Europe and America complain that they struggle 
to find experts to be board members. Thus, many boards 
in the US have appointed directors with experience from 
other firms and industries (Westphal & Milton 2000).
 Actually there is no shortage of qualified directors, 
however, stringent laws and rules pertaining to directorship 
and litigation by shareholders make directors more careful 
in accepting their job (Raber 2005). Companies can no 
longer be satisfied with directors who simply put in a token 
appearance. Companies seek qualified directors, together 
with their expertise (Berube 2005). Furthermore, Michael 
powers, leader of hewitt’s executive compensation group, 
also claimed “...there is a struggle-taking place between 
the growing need for qualified directors and the reluctance 
of directors to join the boards”. A report from Christian & 
Timbers in New york also reflects the tough competition 
when searching for qualified non-executive directors 
(Bates 2003). 
 therefore, based on the past literature, this study 
predicts that director’s expertise plays a significant role 
in enhancing the performance of family companies. the 
experts with special skill and qualification can advise 
family companies better than other directors. therefore, 
this study expects that:
H
4
: there is a positive relationship between director 
expertise and family companies’ performance. 
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LEADERSHIP StRUCtURE
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2001) 
states that there should be a clear division of responsibilities 
at the head of the company, which will ensure a balance 
of power and authority for the Chairman and CEO. CEO 
duality arises when the post of CEO and Chairman are 
managed by one person. Several researchers (Rechner & 
dalton 1991; pi & Timme 1993; Fosberg & Nelson 1999) 
support that separate leadership consistently outperforms 
firms with a duality leadership structure. A survey 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) shows that 
the majority of Malaysian public listed companies practice 
separate leadership. Malaysian studies show evidence that 
Malaysian firms exercise separate leadership (Abdullah 
2001; Che-Ahmad, Abdul Manaf & Ishak 2003; Abdul 
Rahman & Mohd Haniffa 2005). 
 In contrast, duality leadership is common among 
family firms (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis & Wong 2005). 
Family firms feel that the founder-CEOs are more concerned 
with the survival of their firms to protect their legacy 
for future generations. In the US, Moore (2002) found 
that some firms do have the same person as the CEO 
and Chairman because he/she focuses on a company’s 
leadership. they also argue that splitting the role of the 
Chairman and CEO reduces the CEO’s freedom of action 
(Felton & Watson 2002). Furthermore, research found 
that executives that hold duality have significantly higher 
corporate performance (Donaldson & Davis 1991). An 
individual who acts as the CEO and Chairman has the power 
to determine strategy and is responsible for the firm (davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). 
 therefore, based on previous studies, this study posits 
that family companies prefer to practice duality leadership 
as it gives greater power to the same person, who is the 
owner and the manager of the family firm, to make fast 
and prompt decisions. With less bureaucracy, a shorter time 
period is needed and lower costs are involved in managing 
the family companies. thus, it is posited that:
H5: there is a negative relationship between separate 
leadership structure and family companies’ 
performance. 
RESEARCH MEtHODOLOGY
DAtA
this study used Malaysian family companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia (excluding banking and finance and 
insurance sectors) over the period 2003 to 2007. the 
industry is regulated under the Banking and Financial 
Act (BAFIA), 1989. the BAFIA (1989) allows Financial 
Institutions (FIs) to make portfolio investments in non-
financial businesses up to a maximum of 20% of FIs 
shareholders’ funds and up to 10% of the issued share 
capital of a company in which the investment is made. the 
sample size for this study is 189 companies with the base 
year 2003. the data for the companies must be available 
for the five consecutive years in order to be considered 
as the sample. this study adopted a panel data approach 
to analyse the data involving the combination of cross-
sectional and time series (Baltagi 2001). 
 The definition of a family company is consistent with 
previous studies (La Porta, Lopez De-Silanes & Shleifer 
1999; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
In this study, a family-controlled company must fulfil 
three requirements, these are: (1) Founder is the CEO or 
successor of the CEO who is related by blood or marriage, 
(2) with at least two family members in its management, 
and (3) family directors have ownership (direct and indirect 
shareholdings) of a minimum of 20% in the company. In 
determining the family companies, the information on 
directors’ profile, board governance and control variables 
are hand collected from the annual reports and thomson 
Advance Database. 
 the hypotheses variables are board composition 
and size, independent non-executive directors, director’s 
education background, director’s expertise and leadership 
structure. the dependent variables are tobin’s Q, Earnings 
Per Share and Operating Cash Flow. the control variables 
are debt, firm size and firm age. The definition of the 
variables is explained in the next section – 4.2 Research 
Model and Measurement.
RESEACRH MODEL AND MEASUREMENt
the research model is use to test Hypothesis 1 to 
Hypothesis 5.
 PERFit = b0 + b1BSIZEit + b2BINDit + b3BDEGit   + b
4
BEXPit + b5LSHIPit + b6DEBtit b7FAGEit 
  + b8FSIZEit + εit
Whereby;
PERF = tobin’s Q (Market value of ordinary shares 
plus book value of preferred shares and debt 
divided by book value of total assets), Earnings 
Per Share (the published earnings for ordinary 
divided by the average number of shares on issue 
during the period) and Operating Cash Flow (the 
operating profit before tax and extraordinary 
items, adjusted for depreciation and goodwill 
and changes in working capital –that is changes 
in stocks, trade debtors and prepayments and 
changes in creditors and accruals). the variables 
are tested one at a time.
BSIZE =  Number of directors on the board.
BIND  =  % of independent non-executive director/total 
directors.
BDEG = % of directors with degree/total directors.
BEXP = % of directors with professional qualification/
total directors.
LSHIP = Leadership (separate = 1, duality = 0).
DEBt  = Book value of long-term debt/total assets.
FAGE = Number of years since incorporated.
FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets.
εit  = Error term. 
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RESULtS AND DISCUSSION
dESCRIpTIVE ANAlySIS
Based on table 1, the sample size for family companies were 
945 cases comprising annual reports of 189 companies for 
five years. There were 690 companies (73%) from the Main 
board, and 255 companies (27%) from the Second board. 
Nearly two-thirds of the Main board companies represent 
the family companies. these family companies contribute 
significantly to the Malaysian economy by creating jobs 
and supplying resources to the Malaysian markets. these 
findings have supported previous work done by Claessens 
et al. (2001), Ngui (2002) and Soederberg (2003).
average, the board size is around eight people per board. 
the smallest board number was three members and the 
highest number was 17 members. Therefore, this finding 
supports previous studies that recommended seven or 
eight executives on the board to ensure its effectiveness 
(Jensen 1993; pricewaterhouse Coopers 1998; Abdullah 
2001; Amran & Che-Ahmad 2009; Zainal et al. 2009). For 
board independence, the mean was 0.36. this indicates 
that 36% of independent directors sit on the family board. 
This finding is consistent with the Code (2001), which 
suggests that at least 1/3 of the board must be independent 
directors and family businesses do comply with the Code 
requirements. However, family businesses prefer to have 
family members to be on the board, rather than independent 
non-executive directors (Ward, 1991; Cromie et al. 1995; 
Ibrahim et al. 2008). 
tABLE 1. Frequency and Percentage of Family 
Frequency %
Main board
Second board
690
255
73.0
27.0
total 945 100.0
tABLE 2. Frequency and Percentage for Family 
Companies by Industry
 Industry Family Company
Frequency Percent
Consumer Products
Industrial Products
Plantation
trading Services
Construction
Infrastructure Projects
technology
Hotels
Properties
190
320
70
110
95
5
20
10
125
20.1
33.9
7.4
11.7
10.0
0.5
2.1
1.1
13.2
total 945 100.0
 table 2 describes the statistics on family companies on 
Bursa Malaysia based on the industry. Most of the family 
businesses were highly engaged in industrial products 
(33.9%), consumer products (20%), properties (13.2%) 
and construction (10%). However, family companies have 
low involvement in industries like plantations (7.4%), 
technologies (2.1%), hotels (1.1%) and infrastructure 
projects (0.5%).
 the average value of tobin’s Q is 0.79, EPS has 
a mean of 0.10, and OCF shows a mean of 0.08. On 
tABLE 3. Minimum, Maximum Mean and Standard deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Performance:
tobin’s Q
EPS
OCF
.27
-2.94
-1.16
.99
4.77
.78
.79
.10
.08
.11
.31
.11
Board attributes:
BSIZE
BIND
BDEG
BEXP
LSHIP
3.00
.00
.13
.00
.00
17.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
7.87
.36
.72
.26
.90
1.98
.10
.21
.15
.30
Control variables:
DEBt
FSIZE
FAGE
-.45
9.13
.00
.75
18.03
64.00
.09
12.84
8.90
.13
1.33
10.77
tobin’s Q = Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, EPS = Published earnings 
for ordinary shares divided by average number of shares issued during the period, oCF = Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to total assets, 
BSIZE = Number of directors on the board, BINd = percentage of independent non-executive directors divided by total directors, BdEG = percentage 
of directors with degree and above divided by total directors, BEXp = percentage of independent directors with professional qualification divided by 
total directors, lShIp = Type of leadership that a firm practices, whether separate leadership or duality leadership, dEBT = The book value of long-term 
debt by total assets, FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE = Number of years since incorporated.
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 the results also show that about 72% of Malaysian 
directors sitting on the board do have at least a degree 
qualification. Therefore, this finding supports the Code 
(Revised 2007), which encourages firms to search for 
directors who possess certain qualities. In terms of 
director’s expertise, this finding explains that about 
26% of companies have experts sitting on the board.The 
experts are available in the markets, but the experts were 
more careful in accepting the jobs (Forbes 1995; hendry 
2002; Bates 2003; Raber 2005; hartvigsen 2007). In terms 
of leadership structure, 90% of the companies practice 
separate leadership as compared to duality leadership. this 
practice is in line with the Code (2001), Abdullah (2001), 
Che-Ahmad et al. (2003), Abdul Rahman & Mohd Haniffa 
(2005). In terms of debt, the usage of debt was low with 
a mean of about 0.09 and a standard deviation of 0.13. 
The mean for firm size was 13. Whilst, on average, firms 
remain about 9 years in the market, and the oldest firms 
have been able to remain 64 years in the market. 
UNIVARIATE TESTS 
Table 4 highlights the relationship between the variables 
in this study. From the correlation matrix, director’s 
qualification, leadership structure and firm size were 
found to be significant and negatively correlated with 
tobin’s Q. It was evident that there was a strong 
positive correlation between Earnings Per Share with 
board size, directors with degree, debt and firm size. 
The study also shows that board size, debt and firm size 
positively correlate with Operating Cash Flows. Board 
independence was significant and negatively correlated 
with Operating Cash Flows. In sum, some of the board 
mechanisms do show a strong correlation with corporate 
performance indicators.
MUlTIVARIATE REGRESSIoN 
Multivariate regression analysis was adopted to examine 
the panel data for the period of 2003 to 2007. the advantage 
of panel data is that it allows for both cross sectional and 
time series effect in the sample and helps in identifying the 
sources of possibly mingled effects. the panel generalized 
least square (GLS) was utilised in this study. Some 
diagnostic tests were conducted for this study. the Chow’s 
test yields an F-statistic of 6.47. For the heteroscedasticity 
test, the Breusch-pagan/Cook-Weisberg test shows an 
F-statistic of 5.35. The Wooldridge test reveals F-statistic 
of 1.64 and indicates no autocorrelation problem in the 
data. therefore, under these conditions, GLS is a proper 
estimation method because it effectively standardizes the 
observations (Baltagi 2001; Greene 2003).
 Table 5 shows that the findings partially support 
hypotheses H1 and H5. Meanwhile hypotheses H2 and 
H
4
 were significant but in the opposite direction to the 
hypotheses prediction. H3 was not supported at all. 
 Family companies with larger board size (H1) 
enhanced firm performance for EPS and OCF. this indicates 
that the accounting indicators (EPS and OCF) are more 
sensitive, directly related to financial survivability and 
reflect the evaluation of performance (Sun & Tong 2003) 
as compared to the market indicator (tobin’s Q). the 
findings are consistent with previous studies (Chen et al. 
2008; Chen & Nowland 2010). With large boards, family 
firms have more resources, wider external relationship, 
higher problem solving capabilities and diversity in the 
tABLE 4. Correlation Matrix for the Variables
Q 1
EPS -.052** 1
OCF .025 .549*** 1
BSIZE -.035 .161*** .181*** 1
BIND .016 -.034 -.105*** -.199*** 1
BDEG -.064*** .102*** .028 -.103*** .135*** 1
BEXP .027 .005 -.017 -.247*** .237*** .206*** 1
LSHIP -.075** .025 -.013 .005 .073*** .184*** .041 1
DEBt -.019 .096*** .085*** .083*** -.006 .086*** .011 -.045** 1
FAGE -.011 -.017 -.052** .051** .086*** .031 -.080*** -.010 .094*** 1
FSIZE -.168*** .357*** .220*** .301*** .034 .324*** -.059 .045** .431*** .085*** 1
** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), ***significant at 0.01 (2 tailed).
Q = Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, EPS = Published earnings for ordinary shares 
divided by average number of shares issued during the period, oCF = Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to total assets, BSIZE = Number of directors on the 
board, BINd = percentage of independent non-executive directors divided by total directors, BdEG = percentage of directors with degree and above divided by total 
directors, BEXp = percentage of independent directors with professional qualification divided by total directors, lShIp = Type of leadership that a firm practices, whether 
separate leadership or duality leadership, DEBt = the book value of long-term debt by total assets, FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE = Number 
of years since incorporated.
Q EPS
OCF
BSIZE
BIND
BDEG
BEXP
LSHIP
DEBt
FAGE
FSIZE
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board (Zahra & pearce 1989; haleblian & Finkelstein 
1993). therefore, it is relevant that larger boards appear 
to be effective in their oversight duties relative to smaller 
boards. Another explanation as to why Malaysian family-
controlled companies have larger boards may be because 
of the reputation and practice of including a certain number 
of prominent Bumiputera as directors on the board. these 
Bumiputera directors tend to be from the royal families, 
politicians, civil servants and retired police or armed forces 
chiefs. therefore, hypothesis H1 is partially supported.
 In terms of the proportions of the independent non-
executive directors (h2), EPS show a positive direction, 
while OCF (as expected) show a negative direction with 
performance. these differences may be due to the nature 
of measurement for both variables. EPS take into account 
the accrual income and past research shows that accruals 
can be managed and that board independence has some 
influence on the behaviour of accruals. This behaviour is 
likely to be more prevalent in family companies and may 
influence the results (Ibrahim et al. 2008; Amran & Che 
Ahmad 2009). EPS also take into account the number of 
outstanding shares. As such, even if the two companies 
have equal earnings or equal size, they may have a different 
number of shares outstanding at the same time. these lines 
of reasoning warrant further research. 
 However, the finding also evidenced that family 
companies with a lower number of independent directors 
enhance family firms’ performance (when measured 
using OCF). This finding is consistent with the predicted 
hypothesis in this study. We would expect that in family 
companies, the executive directors will dominate the 
discussions in the board meetings. As such, the presence of 
independent non-executive directors is likely to just fulfil 
the requirements of the Code (2001). to the best of our 
knowledge, OCF has not been used in studies of corporate 
performance. We thought that this measure of performance, 
as researched in other areas, could also be used to provide 
information from another perspective for the performance 
studies. the results suggest that OCF is a good measure 
of performance, especially for studies involving family 
companies.
 this study also found that directors with education 
background (H3) does not influence the family firm 
performance. In addition, this study also reveals a 
contradictory result for H
4
. the higher the percentage of 
experts on the board, the lower the performance. In fact, 
family companies with few experts show better firm’s 
performance (using tobin’s Q and EPS). We speculate that 
a lower number of experts results in better discussion, 
faster agreements among the members and speedy 
decision making. Whilst, a greater number of experts are 
generally good for opinion gathering such as in academic 
conferences, a smaller number of experts might be more 
suitable and expedient for board efficiency. Thus, firm 
performance is enhanced.
 In terms of leadership structure (H5), family 
businesses that practice separate leadership have lower 
firm performance. This implies that family companies 
prefer a duality leadership structure. the reason may be 
that the leader wants to protect their family legacy (Chen 
et al. 2005), focus on the company leadership (Moore 
2002), higher freedom in making the decisions (Felton 
& Watson 2002), greater power to determine company 
strategy and responsible for the company (Davis et al. 
1997). However, the hypothesis variable for H5 is not 
significant when EPS is used as the dependent variable. this 
could be due to the nature of data (i.e., accrual vs. cash), 
which is already discussed above. In addition, the data is 
tABLE 5.  GLS Estimation for Board Mechanisms and Family Companies Performance
Board 
mechanism: sign
Q EPS OCF
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
BSIZE (H1) + .000 .001 .003*** .001 .004*** .001
BIND (H2) - .017 .014 .093*** .018 -.017* .010
BDEG (H3) + -.003 .013 .025 .017 -.007 .008
BEXP (H
4
) + -.053*** .016 -.058*** .019 .006 .011
LSHIP (H5) - -.031*** .007 -.012 .009 -.013*** .004
DEBt .039*** .015 -.077 .060 -.024 .009
FSIZE -.008*** .003 .046 .004 .006*** .002
FAGE -.000 .000 .001*** .001 .000*** .000
_CONS .967*** .030 -.548* .046 -.004 .020
R2 0.0483 0.1462 0.0282
* significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), ***significant at 0.01 (2 tailed).
tobin’s Q = Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, EPS = Published earnings for ordinary 
shares divided by average number of shares issued during the period, oCF = Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to total assets, BSIZE = Number of directors 
on the board, BINd = percentage of independent non-executive directors divided by total directors, BdEG = percentage of directors with degree and above divided by 
total directors, BEXp = percentage of independent directors with professional qualification divided by total directors, lShIp = Type of leadership that a firm practices, 
whether separate leadership or duality leadership, DEBt = the book value of long-term debt by total assets, FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE 
= Number of years since incorporated.
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limited to five years only. perhaps, a longer time period 
may be more appropriate and may capture better effects 
statistically. the results also suggest that EPS might not be a 
good measure of performance for studies involving family 
companies. Further research is warranted to corroborate 
this argument.
 Debt was found to help family companies enhance 
company performance (when measured using tobin’s Q). 
A higher amount of debt shows a signal of investment 
opportunity for family companies. the amount of debt 
can be used to expand family businesses (Marsh 1982; 
Hovakimian, Opler & titman 2001). Firm size reveals 
mixed directions. on the one hand, larger firm size helps 
to boost company performance (when measured using 
OCF). Family companies with high cash flows will have 
greater opportunity to expand their businesses. Thus, firm 
performance is enhanced (Trow 1961; helmich 1977). 
however, on the other hand, large firm size can contribute 
to unmanageable business operations, and lead to a fall 
in firm performance when measured using Q (daily & 
dollinger 1992). For firm age, matured family companies 
enhanced greater firm performance. As firm age increases, 
the managers learn more about their abilities over time 
(Evans 1987b). 
CONCLUSION, LIMItAtIONS AND FUtURE StUDY 
Overall, this study found that some of the board mechanisms 
influence the family companies’ performance. The findings 
explain that family businesses with larger board size, low 
number of experts and duality leadership lead to higher 
family companies’ performance. Meanwhile, director’s 
qualification does not influence the family performance. 
Family businesses believe that power and control need 
to remain in the hands of family members – usually the 
founder or the successor of the company. Furthermore, 
strong family ties and beliefs made family businesses 
different from non-family companies. thus, regulators 
and investors need to understand that family companies 
have different characteristics than non-family companies. 
Although these conflicting results necessitate further study, 
future revisions of the Code should take these factors into 
consideration. 
 In terms of limitations, this study only considers using 
the family companies’ sample. Also, three measurements 
for dependent variables using market based and accounting 
based were applied in this study, but show inconsistent 
results. thus, future studies may consider private family 
businesses. Although it is more difficult to get the data, the 
results would be more pronounced since private entities 
are not subject to Bursa Malaysia regulations. 
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